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INTERVIEW WITH PAUL WOODIE
BY J. WATRAS
JUNE 28, 1994

JW:

Mr. Woodie, I'd like to ask you some questions about

the Dayton View Stabilization Project.
PW:

Okay.

JW:

You were saying that there were some simple reasons for

leaving, or it ending?
PW:

Yes, one was the fact was the specialized funding

ended. Code Enforcement ended.

The other part was - do you want

to stop?
JW:

Code Enforcement ended.

PW:

... ended and it was rolled into the Model Cities, or

city-wide Model Cities.

JW:

And Joe Wine became the task force manager of Model

cities.
RW:

Right.

very simple.

Now the reason that that occurred was really

The side office was staff, Carrie and I, wrote up

the model, the city-wide Model Cities Program.

JW:

Oh, did you?

RW:

Yeah.

And, if you look at the city-wide Model cities

structure, it was designed after the Dayton View stabilization
Project.

And Wedge called the Dayton View Coalition area became

the Northwest Priority Board; its Board, its constitution, was
the same as that of the Dayton View Coalition, initially. And the
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coordinator, the Priority Board Coordinator, was the same grade
and job description of Joe's.

JW:

So the city-wide Model cities came more out of the

Dayton View Stabilization Project than it does come out of the
Model Cities Project?
PW:

Oh, absolutely.

Oh, yeah.

It's nothing but taking the

Dayton View Stabilization Project and taking it and making it
city-wide.

That's exactly what it was.

JW:

My golly.

PW:

It was everything but the old Model cities area.

Initially, the original Model cities area, was not a part of
city-wide Model cities.

It was separate and apart.

It had its

own planning council; it was not a part of the priority board
system or anything.

JW:

So it didn't become a part of the city-wide until the

priority boards?
PW:

No, way after that.

Model Cities Planning Council

continued to exist, even after the priority boards existed in the
rest of the city.
Concept.

It was called the Neighborhood City Hall

I actually did it with Carrie's help, and submitted it

to Jim Kunde.

And that became the grant application for the

city-wide Model cities Program.

It had a coordinator.

We

thought about the original structure of the city-wide Model
cities Program.

The side office was called the Side Office.

The

head of the Side Office was called the Coordinator, which is the
same as Joe Wine's.

There was an assistant coordinator, there
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were specialists underneath, an Education person, like Percy and
there was the physical person, ...

JW:

The Dayton View stabilization Project.

PW:

So there was no need; it really didn't end; it got

folded in.

carrie became the first coordinator of Northwest.

She replaced Joe in effect.

And then Joe came downtown and

became the task force manager.

The role of the task force

manager was to take the issues areas, economic development,
transportation, employment, and housing and integrate them.

The

task force manager was the manager who set up all the committee
structures in the subject areas.
to add that dimension to it.

And that's what Joe's role was,

Because Joe always complained that

there was no coordinated effort in terms of all housing
providers, and there was no coordination between transportation
and housing and so he was made the task force manager and came
downtown.

JW:

Okay, I see how it meant.

Did he, then, have any

relationship to what was going on in the Demonstration Project at
Inner West, or was that ... ?
PW:

That was still separate.

city-wide Model cities ended.

And then, I think, about 1974

Inner West Model Cities, like one

year, in which it finally got folded in.
folded in.

And that staff got

Because it was the year, let's see ... that Ron Gatton

went to Washington.

When did Jimmy Carter get elected?

1976.

So Model cities got folded in about 1974, late 1974, and then Ron
left to go over to Jimmy Carter.

That would have been 1977.
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JW:

It was 1976 or 1977 when Model cities ended.

PW:

What did he go to Washington for?

JW:

Accusations about problems in Atlanta and other cities

that were brought up as being disasters.

And there was a

campaign to save it, which seemed to have been built upon the
Dayton experience.

There was

brochure that Dayton published to

try to advertise the successes that we had here.
PW:

Yeah.

Well, anyway, the reason I remember that, the

important critical part, was that Charles Jones, who was, in
effect, the director of the CVA, which was the original Model
cities neighborhood, Inner West, he was the director who got
folded into city-wide Model cities.

So he then moved downtown.

I remember when Charles moved downtown that's when they got
consolidated.

Because the offices were closed, in Inner West,

and the administrative staff was moving into city hall, in the
same offices as city-wide Model cities. So it became one Model
cities program.

It only lasted ... because I remember in 1975

Model Cities disappeared.

And all that staff was folded into the

regular city operations.
JW:

And became priority boards, I guess.

PW:

Well, yeah.

Now they didn't become priority boards;

they came into all the departments of the city.
JW:

Oh.

PW:

The priority boards were just the coordinators and a

few people.

The other staff, and there were maybe 50

professional staff people, got folded into the regular city
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organization.

Went to office of manage the budget; that was the

director there; I took over the 701 Planning Process.

The

Government Relations, which was a grant writing process, liaison
to Washington and to the state of Ohio and that kind of stuff.
So that all became a part of the regular city organization in
1975.
JW:

The Dayton View stabilization Project often claimed

some relationship, or an effort, to improve the schools as well
as to improve the neighborhoods, although it was Code Enforcement
- Joe Wine somehow often pointed to the Multiple-motivation grant
at Longfellow School.

When I was talking to Carrie Zsombach, she

said that there wasn't really much relationship between what went
on in the schools and what went on in the Dayton View
Stabilization Project.
PW:

Yeah, it depends on how you look at it.

day-to-day operations, that's probably true.

In terms of

There was

coordination; for example, at Longfellow School Multiplemotivation operated ... what was her name?
JW:

Joanne Summers.

PW:

... Joanne Summers was at Longfellow and Greg Caras -

they ran that program.

The way we interfaced with that program

was the side office was land, the Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund.

She

talked about that, but we then ran, connected, the social service
efforts to the school.
JW:

Okay.
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PW:

Multiple-motivation was individual guided education of

all kinds of specialized education components. But we did things
like counsel families to try to come back to Good Sam Mental
Health, which operated out of the Side Office.

That person

operated out of the Side Office and worked with children at
Longfellow.
kids.

Ran the Shoe Program.

Gave tennis shoes to all the

It was called the Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund.

funded by Model Cities and by the Side Office.
Office and then by Model cities.
JW:

That was

By the Side

So, while it's true ...

After Model cities became city-wide, not from money

from the demonstration project ...
PW:

Each part of Model Cities received allocation and

Northwest used its money to continue the projects funded at the
Side Office, like the Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund, the Belke Trash
Program, which was a Side Office project, that Joe ran.

I think

Good Sam, a little bit, was paid out of that money out of Model
cities.

So the effort of the Side Office was paid for when it

was rolled in.

There was no end to the Side Office.

never been an end to the Side Office.

There has

The thing called the

Dayton View Stabilization Side Office ended some day in August,
1973, or something like that.

The people and everything else,

really rolled into the city-wide project.
JW:

That's a very nice way to think about it.

that that's what happened.

I'm glad

The Dayton View Stabilization Project

did become involved in schools where there were some
disturbances; for example, in 1971 or 1972 there were some
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disturbances at Jefferson and at Colonel White.

And I guess the

people gave tours or in-services to teachers who tried to provide
some kind of conflict or resolution ...
PW:

Yes, we also had a youth council, the Detached Worker

Program, which was John Weaver, who walked with the kids as they
left the school building to make sure that they went home and
didn't go in gangs.

JW:

Now that stuff didn't continue with the, or did it,

with the city-wide Model cities Program?
PW:

Yes, all that continued.

JW:

Oh, my.

So there is still that relationship with

school programs.
PW:

The Detached Worker Program didn't end until 1980

something.
funded.

I hired John Weaver when that program was no longer

Of course, they were all upset about that.

To this day

the Priority Board screamed that the city disinvested in social
service programming and they always use as an example the
Detached Worker Program.

That is an example of the city's

abandonment.
JW:

So that was funded, then, by local funds rather than by

federal funds?
PW:

No, it was funded by Model Cities.

government selling block land funds.

Oh, then by

Model cities monies ended.

Then, I guess it was Nixon, rolled up all the Model cities
programs and all the categorical grant programs into block grants
and there were general revenue sharing, community development
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revenue sharing, health revenue sharing, educational revenue
sharing the community development sharing continued in priority
boards and certain programs.

But what happened was that every

year thereafter, I guess this is when Reagan became President, he
did a slash job on all urban programs.

So he slashed the

community development block program, I don't know, maybe 40%.

So

that many of the functions, other than the hardcore housing
efforts, had to be abandoned.

So detached workers and the

Dorothy Palmer Shoe Fund went out the window.

Because they also

then put a kabosh on all social service programming because they
were basically anti-social service programming.
end all of those programs.

So they made us

Then the city was in a fiscal crisis

so the city couldn't pick them up.

So that's why Human Services

all went down the tubes, but Code Enforcement continued.

JW:

NOw, the Code Enforcement grant offered, besides simply

forcing people to refurbish or rehabilitate their ...
PW:

... the old Code Enforcement ...

JW:

Yes, the original Code Enforcement grant offered low

interest loans ...
PW:

Oh, yes, grants, street improvements ...

JW:

But there was some problem that there weren't many of

them approved, or at least by 1972 or 1973, before the Dayton
View Stabilization Program ended.
PW:

You mean nationally?
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JW:

No, in the Dayton View area you only have a handful of

things approved, or at least according to one of the papers that
I got.
PW: I don't know.
of the program.

I wasn't involved in that whole portion

That was really run downtown.

The loans and

grants programs were a part of the community, not by the Side
Office.
JW:

One of the early planned proposals about the Dayton

View Stabilization Project, well, Model cities as well, they both
claim that they were among the first of the efforts to think of
urban renewal in a broad, social sense.

That instead of simply

physical plan or land use, they thought about social services,
such as employment, education, ...
PW:

Crime prevention ...

JW:

... crime prevention.

Is that true?

Did that represent

a real change?
PW:

Oh, yes.

JW:

And was that something which was national or local?

PW:

It was originally local, because of what Dayton was at

the time.

That was a dramatic change.

And people like Joe and probably Graham Watt, who was

the city manager, and Jeff Coe, who ran the community Research,
Inc., which was the think tank of the community.

And Jeff was

extremely liberal, and very far-slighted in things like that.

So

we were probably on the cutting edge of all of that stuff, but
eventually, that also got reflected in national
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We were

probably, early on and probably in other cities, while other
cities sort of drug along, we were actually advocates for it.
JW:

Actually pushing in that direction, yeah.

PW:

So it came easy to us, as opposed to other cities where

it was like revolution.
JW:

Now you had many visitors come to see the Dayton View

Stabilization Program when it was begun; people from other cities
as well as u.S. senators and representatives.
PW:

Yeah.

I think the big difference here is that until

that time in the '60's, those efforts were often considered
minority efforts and if you thought about it, they were all black
programs run by minorities, for minorities, and were adjuncts,
arms-length away from cities.

It was the way that central

cities, dominated by whites, had not yet moved out, satisfied the
national effort to provide something to minorities by throwing
money at them and organizations which were never a part of the
regular organizations.

They didn't go through regular civil

service, they weren't regular anything, regular employees; they
weren't regular nothing.

They were just federal employees forced

upon us by the national government.

JW:

That didn't happen here.

Well, it did in the sense of the Model cities

Demonstration Grant.
PW:

Yes, because national policy encouraged it.

always resented it, resisted it.

So we always had these other

efforts, which were more integrative.
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But Dayton

JW:

There was a study - Marshall Gants and other - but

anyway, HUD commissioned a comparative study of 11 cities of
which Dayton was one, who received the initial planning grant for
Model Cities.
PW:

Yeah.

JW:

Yes.

The original Model cities.
The Model cities Demonstration Project 1967.

Score, I guess, wrote the original proposal.
PW: Yeah, right; Score did.
JW:

In that comparative study, they said that Dayton was

atypical in the sense of resident control; they had much more
resident control than any other city.

The Planning Council had

much more say ...
PW:

Yes, that's always been true, though.

That wasn't

unusual.
JW:

It was something that was first run by the federal

government, it was something that those residents deserved.
PW:

That's true today, though.

I mean it falls into the

study of the cease of the Human Development Block grant today and
the role of the citizens in the capital planning process of the
city, ours is not token.
the proposals.

citizens actually make almost all of

I mean, people come here and they go, "Oh, yeah,

we all have citizen committees."

But our citizen committees

actually make the decisions. So it's a lot different.

It's

always been that way here, though.
JW:

This particular comparative study, however, of which

I'm speaking, warned that that might be a danger; they really
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preferred parody, what they called "parody," that there was an
equal sharing between the professionals and the residents.
PW:

Yes, that's a big issue here.

Institute study.

That wasn't an Oberlin

Oberlin Institute, out of D.C.?

Area

?

Because ...
JW:

I don't remember that.

I remember Marshall Gans, three

letters ... Marshal Con Gans and ... a third name ...
PW:

The only reason I say that is because that was the

Oberlin Institute, the think tank of D.C.
JW:

Oh, and it's a conservative group?

PW:

No, they're not conservative.

But they did a lot of

urban studies and their comment, always, through the 70's and
80's about Dayton's budgetary process, the performance process,
MBO process, about the way we rate departments, why merit
increases that were so driven by public opinion and referendum
notions, that we actually had gone overboard and destroyed
professional decision-making.

So a claim against the Model

cities program is a claim against the way the city operates.
That we're too responsive and that in fact what happens there's
no confidence in planning process, there is no deductive
reasoning on anything.

Anything is, "Now, wait a minute; what's

the last public opinion poll say?"

It's like the worst form of

bureaucracy in that you have no professional civil service, but
what you have are civil servants which are totally subserviant to
the committee of such-and-such.

It's still going on today.
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JW: And that's unusual since we were one of the cities to
adopt the city manager system which was to take politics and
public opinion out of city management.
PW:

People think it's a reaction to the fact that because

we were strong city manager form, we had destroyed in our vicker
to have a professional government in the teens, 20's, 30's, and
40's, that we had destroyed all forms of politics.

We were like

rabid of non-partisans. And that you couldn't mention a political
party in Dayton.

If you put that on a poster, that was death of

the candidate.

JW:

And there was the All-Dayton committee ...

PW:

The All-Dayton committee was supposed to be this nice

group of people who decided for us, who should even run.

JW:

Yes, they did.

PW:

And no one ever succeeded in winning without their

endorsement.

JW:

until 1969 when SOS came in.

PW:

Right, when SOS came in.

So back in 1913 or 1915,

because they actually lost the 1913 election, which caused the
All-Dayton committee to be formed because the socialists actually
won.

The business community did not want to do that; they

couldn't live with that so they formed this coalition with labor
unions, the Democrats and Republicans, to keep everybody out.
And they self-selected people for years.

Well, what you have is

this built-up resentment on the part of people who became

13

politically active, there was no way into the system.

So when it

went, it went big time.
JW:

And we're still ...

PW:

We're still into this small democracy thing.

It's

laughable when you read in the paper that the eastern study by a
group of business people saying that this government is not
responsive.

What they mean by "this government is not

responsive" is that this government is not responsive to the
elite.

This government disdains the elite in the business

community.
here.

But they are very responsive to the citizens who live

We all sit there and laugh because the opposite is the

truth.

This is a too-responsive government.

We let the citizens

decide what streets get closed without regards to good traffic
patterns, we let citizens decide almost ... there is a point at
which you're not doing your job as a civil servant.

And I think

that's always been in effect for the last 30 years.
JW:

When I looked at the Model cities Demonstration Project

and in education when they were calling for black control of
black schools, something which the school board would not give,
it turned out that they were right, at least the court justified
it, that would have been an illegal act.

At any rate, I couldn't

find that there were any sUbsistence of issues with the exception
of personnel issues, that the black control of black schools
would have meant.
issues?

Is that to some extent true, about city

I guess you're saying no because you're saying that
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traffic patterns are decided at a local level, and that would
have been a sUbsistence issue.
PW:

Oh, yeah, these are all sUbsistence issues.

JW:

curriculum seemed not to have changed and the school

board would have approved the curriculum that was brought in,
with or without local control.
PW:
services.
JW:

Yes.

It clearly does affect the nature of city

There is no doubt about that.
What would you say would be the most outstanding

success of the Dayton View Stabilization Project?
PW:

I think probably in 2 areas: one is a sense of

in

the city in a reasonable way as to citizen involvement and
citizen decision-making.

Model cities was probably pretty

extreme and how it went about it.

The Stabilization program

tended to advocate the same kind of citizen involvement in city
hall and in regular programming, but for all the wrong reasons.

hall.

JW:

When they did it through the Dayton View Coalition?

PW:

Through the Coalition, through the contacts at city

In fact, I was hired, and this is to show how bizarre Joe

was, he insisted that there be an analyst out there so that city
hall became sensitized to real needs, by having somebody at city
hall who was commissioned out there. If you read the articles,
they always played that tune.
to somebody in city hall.

In fact, he insisted that I report

So that I had to report back every

week so that city hall became sensitized.
We always used to laugh.

This is Joe's vision.

I remember one of the first things 15

carrie and I sat one night at the Coalition meeting and wrote
down all the little things that Joe said and one was to sensitize
the social service delivery system and bring this to the urban
milieu.

And there was this little plaque that we had made for

Joe that said, "To sensitize the social service delivery system
and to bring this to the urban milieu."

When Joe retired, he

gave me that plaque and I still have that plaque.
inheritor of whatever that means.

And I'm the

Joe was always worried about

institutionalizing things; changing the nature of the way people
think. The Planning Council tended to be more separate in terms
of we what control of the means of production, the hiring
practices, the program itself.
always refused to run things.

And Joe didn't want that.

And that's why you have all this

equivocation of strange stuff like Multiple-motivation.
didn't have much to do with them.
meeting.

He

We

Except Joe attended every damn

Made us go to every meeting and made us advocate it at

every single meeting.

But he wanted the school board to do it.

with Good Sam, he insisted that the city not hire the health
person.

The city farmed Good Sam, but the city insisted that

Good Sam do what it's supposed to do for mental health.

So Joe

was always an advocate of getting institutions to do their job,
getting united Way agencies to do what they're supposed to do,
not doing for them, which is just the opposite of the Model
cities experiment.

Model cities was to duplicate what other

agencies did by putting a new entity ...
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JW:

... what they call satellite corporations.

PW:

... satellite corporations.

to that concept.

Joe was adamantly opposed

He believed in using the existing institutions

and making them do what they're supposed to do.

He was always

for sabotaging and undermining the efforts of others.

JW:

I did interview him before he died, in much the same

way that I'm interviewing you, and he once said that he set up
the Dayton View Coalition to become a board of directors to
protect himself from his employers, the city commission.
PW:

That's probably true.

JW:

So that these people were more radical than he was and

he selected them through an institute called Malichi?
PW:

Yes, Malichi.

JW:

From Don Wicks at the theological seminary.

And so he

could go to the city commission of the city manager and say,
"Well, this is what they want me to do."
PW:

"What can I do?"

JW:

Right, right.

PW:

He also made sure that the Coalition was composed of

anybody who knew anybody and had any connection, either socially
or

, who lived in Dayton View.

So it was also a network.

He didn't think about that, because he didn't think about
networking.

But Joe knew that what he wanted was people of

influence, who were radical, more radical than him, but also
people who had contacts so that as soon as something happened in
this whole force of people, like Mike Adler and I, would just
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pounce on the world, albeit the media, albeit all city
commissioners, whatever it may be.

Get the MVRPC to do the

Housing Dispersal plan, or whatever it may be.
everywhere.

And it created this force.

So they would be

Yes, Joe was very good

at that.

JW:

It had a bias toward professionalism, which much have

been .... You're talking about the Housing Dispersal Plan - that
seemed to have been an important aspect of the Dayton View
Stabilization Project, that people said that it would be
impossible to succeed, where the only place where AfricanAmericans could buy homes would be Dayton View.
PW:

That's right.

JW:

So there was some effort to force the suburbs to

accept ...
PW:

Which didn't work.

JW:

Why didn't it work?

PW:

Because people didn't want it to happen, that's why.

The fact of the matter is, the politics ... I guess the problem was
this.

Those who were advocates for were mostly Dale Burch, white

liberals who believed in playing a fair game.
peoples' motivations and statements.

Also trusted

The fact is they followed

John Locke when the rest of the world was following Hobbs.
they got out-maneuvered.

JW:

And the way they got out-maneuvered was that the

different ...
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So

PW:

People would agree to anything.

And not mean a word of

JW:

But there was no way to enforce the open housing, for

it.

example, of ...

SIDE TWO

PW:

It would do so by saying that unless you got signed up

in the Housing Dispersal Plan, your community cannot receive
federal funds.

That was their big stint.

That held so long as

there was a support for that policy in Washington.

Which changed

with the winds, depending on who was in the White House.
were also exceptions.

There

Any time there was a big project along,

the business community would advocate its leadership
responsibility.
project.

"We'll do the Dispersal Plan. But not on this

"We must have this ... you can't stop economic

development for social programming."

So they would make grand

exceptions and everybody knew that they made grand exceptions and
all these little burgs knew that all they had to do was rattle a
few cages in the business community and the business community
would give their bidding for them to make this an exception.

So

there really wasn't a buy-in.

JW:

There were, essentially, three different efforts - is

that correct - to try to push fair housing or housing dispersal?
PW:

That number doesn't mean anything to me.
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JW:

There were 3 different proposals that I came across in

the archives in the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission.
It seems to be that 1971, 1973, and 1974 were the years.
PW:
that.

Oh, three different proposals.

That's probably true.

Oh, okay.

I remember

It got updated, more joined, it got

modified, that kind of stuff.

I'm going back to an earlier point

- you were saying what did the .. .

JW:

... was its success .. .

PW:

... success.

One was, and not 100%, this whole notion

of institutionalizing certain concepts of contemporary urban
planning inside city hall institutions, departments, and all that
and that was successful.

Successful not because anybody ever

measured it, but because the people who were involved in it,
Joe's philosophy, the fact that Joe has a special role in city
hall today is really in the minds of that set of directors who
came out of that era and Joe was the father of.

I think most

people would recognize that Joe played this role of mentor for
hundreds of people within city hall.

JW:

But he wasn't trained in urban policy,

PW:

No.

was he?

He was clearly, by far, the father, or whatever

you want to call it, this person who almost anybody in city hall
today, if you say "Joe Wine" they'll tell you all these fond
memories they have of Joe, but they'll also tell you that Joe
probably is the one person who had more influence on their
thinking than anybody else.

Including people who are not even

here any more who are city managers in other cities.
20

Who came

from Dayton.

So Joe did institutionalize this notion.

project did do these things inside city hall.

And the

City hall is

dramatically different.
JW:

Did the project - now the way in which the plan states

about Dayton View Stabilization Project is that 3 or 4
neighborhood associations got together and they proposed this to
Graham Watt who then proposed it to the city commission.

Joe

Wine was city commissioner; he resigned to become the director.
That story seems to imply that this fell on Joe, the Dayton View
Stabilization Project, that it simply was there and he took it.
Did he do more than that?

Did he create it?

PW:

Yes.

JW:

Did he encourage those

make this proposal.

neighborhood associations to

This was his idea before he became city

manager?
PW:

I can't imagine that it's not true.

Joe would have always done things.

And that's the way

I don't know that for a fact

because I wasn't here at the time, but why would it be any
different?

Joe always worked through other people; that was

Joe's thing.

Joe always got others to come to the realization.

JW:

That's amazing.

pW:

So if you look at it, everything happened that way.

That's always why when you say what did the Dayton View
Stabilization Program do, you start asking people and they say,
"Well, now what control did you have of Multiple-motivation?"
"None."

"What control did you have over Good Sam?"
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"None."

How

about the loans and grants programs? Were they an issue?"
"Out of the Side Office." "No."
long?"

"No."

"Well, what did he do all day

Well, that's why he was hired.

And that's why you can go

through the newspapers and periodically throughout that entire
era they'll be these little articles about what does he really
do.
JW:

Oh, yeah, there were real complaints about his money.

The city commission wanted ...
PW:
did?

And what did he do?

He agitated them.

What did he do?

You know what he

Well, that's what he did.

He agitated

them; he would change public policies out of them; he would get
hundreds of people to advocate the change in that public policy
and it would be changed.

And there would be resentment because

they would say, "What did he do all day?"
did.

Joe.

Well, that's what he

He got everybody else to do everything.
JW:

By "all day" you mean 24 hours.

PW:

Literally.

I worked so many hours, when I worked for

And since you were required by federal law to record your

hours, but I had so many hours that they owed me a year.

And

they couldn't pay it to me; where would they get the money.
had to sign all these documents giving up my year ...

So I

No, Joe

worked 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
JW: I think I noticed in the newspapers that he actually
physically grew; that he was at first described as being 6'3" and
by the time of his funeral, and Kap Haywood wrote his eulogy and
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an article praising him, and he's 6'5".

So just his stature must

have ..•
PW:

That's probably true.

gentleman.

Well, he also became a

Joe was this, when I first met him, people used to

get mad. He also had the foulest language in public.
go to the meetings and just gross people out.

So he would

And they would

write letters about how can this person come to a public meeting
and talk the way he does.

They not only heard the gross words he

used, they hated the words he used because the things he would
say to people would ... l remember when he went to Southeast in my
neighborhood and told them what a bunch of racists they were,
people were in shock. They never expected anybody to actually
tell them to their face that they were that way; they expected
him to come and speak in sign language, which is the gentle way
of doing it.
gentler.

And he didn't do that.

As Joe got older he got

So a lot of people remember Joe when he cleaned up his

language.

That was his very thoughtful kind of reserve person,

which wasn't the Joe I knew.

JW:

I didn't meet him until he was ill, so I don't really

know ... What did he do for a living before he became a city
commissioner?
PW:

Joe was on the city commission in those days. Not only

did the All-Dayton committee select who it would be, each
corporation had their person.

And, of course, the main

corporations were Rikes, NCR and General Motors, and the labor
union.

There were always the labor union, AFL-ClO; there was
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always somebody there representing the Rike-Kumler Co. and Joe
was the personnel director of the Rike-Kumler Co.
JW:

Oh, that's where he worked.

PW:

And Joe was the one who busted Rikes.

strangely

enough, here's Joe being the personnel director of the RikeKumler Co. - I don't know how he ever pulled this off - and he is
leading the march on Rike-Kumler for their hiring practices.

Now

I don't know how in the hell he ... attacking his own corporation.
And he's the personnel director?

JW:

Well, it was consistent with what he did in city hall,

it seems.
PW:

Hmm, hmm.

He literally marched on the building, onto

the escalators with Jim McGee.

Did you ever interview Jim McGee?

JW:

No, I have not met him yet.

PW:

Joe and Mayor McGee - because they're like •..

JW:

Well, they were.

PW:

Oh, yeah.

Jim McGee would know the entire history of

the real Joe.

JW:

Now that's surprising because I have some articles when

the Dayton View stabilization Project was proposed where McGee
was then city commissioner and he was complaining that it was
serving one neighborhood and not all.
PW:

I don't know what that means.

best of friends for life.
Jim McGee.

But they were like the

There was nobody closer to Joe than

He can tell you about those days before me and Joe's
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involvement in the civil rights movement, which is a pretty
important part of all of this history.
JW:

That's where his interest in the Dayton View

stabilization grant came from his ...
PW:

Oh, yes.

Joe was very much involved in the civil

rights movement.
JW:

Well, I always thought of the stabilization grant as

the civil rights movement, actually.

But I suppose you're

thinking of it as urban renewal than you are thinking of it as
civil rights.
PW:

Oh, no. Not the civil rights movement in Dayton in

regards to busing Rike-Kumler, busting the theaters downtown Joe was involved in that.
theaters downtown.

Black weren't allowed to go to the

Joe was involved in all of that; he was a

hardcore civil rights activist.

And him and Jim McGee and Don

Crawford, were the crux of the commission at the time.
on the city commission with him, too.
history.
with Joe.

Don was

They can tell you that

And that's the Joe they sort of remember, growing up
You can't basically deal with the stabilization thing

unless you deal with Jim McGee and Don Crawford because both of
them were city hall people looking down on Joe in the Dayton
Stabilization Project as he came to the city commission meeting
or sent people.

So when McGee attacks Joe, it's tongue in cheek.

Now the one thing about Jim McGee, it wouldn't matter if ... Jim
McGee believed in certain things and if he thought that something
was not right, it didn't matter if you were his best friend.
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That's just the way he was.

.

And if he felt like philosophically

there should not be a program that favored one neighborhood over
another, he'd say that no ... he'd put you out on the job; he
wouldn't care.
property rights.

That's just the way he was.

He believed in

He didn't care and he was opposed to housing

inspectors going into peoples' houses without a warrant.

That

was unconstitutional and he didn't give a hoot if the damn house
broke down.

He believed in property.

And you knew that if you

did anything on the city commission, to propose anything that
diminished anybody's property rights, he'd be oppose to it.
That's just the way he was.
wouldn't mean anything.

He was a very good person.

So that

But he was also very supportive of Joe

in his efforts. You understand that when city-wide Model Cities
was created, everybody assumed that Joe was going to be the
director of the city-wide program.

I don't know if anybody told

you about that.

JW:

No.

PW: Because Carrie and I had written city-wide Model cities
program and we both worked for Joe.

It was assumed that Joe was

going to be the director of the city-wide effort and that Carrie
and I would then go work for Joe on the city-wide priority board
effort.

And Jim Kunde decided, for whatever reason, that he was

going to bring in this person from Chicago, who was Ron Gant. The
reason that Joe was moved downtown and did not remain as the
coordinator was because it was assumed he was going to be
director, they created his position called "Task Force Manager"
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as a consolation prize for Joe.
history.

People forget that little

And Joe was absolutely decimated that he was not

appointed as the director.

But what it was was that a lot of

people in city hall, the old timers, that Joe had ... they finally
could get one.

JW:

And they did.

PW:

And they did.

Because it was like he had bugged them

for 5 years, relentlessly, week after week, attacking every
single director for some thing.

And now they had a chance to

make sure that he had to pay.

JW:

And he did.

PW:

And he did.

JW:

That's too bad.

PW:

That happens.

afterwards about that.

JW:

Yeah.

And Joe was pretty philosophical
If you bug everybody, you pay.

And if you describe his way of operating as

instigating rather than creating, than he could do best as task
force manager rather than director.
PW:

Right.

JW:

I really want to thank you for this.

PW:

You're welcome.

JW:

You've been very helpful.

PW:

Going down memory lane.

There were a lot of those

people who had different dimensions of the Stabilization program
like Jim McGee or Don Crawford, or even Tim Reardon, who's now
the action city manager.

He worked for Joe, too.
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JW:

Oh, I didn't know that.

PW:

He was hired by Ron and then I hired Tim and then I put

Tim under Joe.

So they became very good friends.

different perspective than I do.

So Tim has a

Because Tim is not an activist.

So his view is more of Joe's creative aspect as opposed to his
analytical abilities.

He will give you this whole thing about

how Joe couldn't add one and one.

He was absolutely terrible.

He never let Joe handle any money, because he could never keep
track of it.

It was just like he had no notion of money at all

and it began with this dollar and ended with that dollar.
never took care of anything budgetarily.

So he

Nothing to do with any

numbers, because it didn't matter what the numbers were. Sixty
percent of the people said this ... if it didn't serve his
philosophical point, what then was the relevant data.

He was

absolutely terrible with data.

JW: But he did try to use you to prove that the things they
were doing would work.
PW:

Use, you see.

analytical.

Joe's view was not objective,

And here's Tim, who's more open about this thing.

But Tim was this pure analyst.

He is the perfect analyst.

That's why he's the finance director, the budget director.

He is

the person who believes ... I mean, if there's a religion, he does
believe in analysis as the ultimate religion, I am sure.

Because

everything can be objectivized in Tim's mind; everything can be
measured. And there is truth in numbers.
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Well, Joe would believe

that there is no truth in numbers except what you make of them.
So they would be like this old ...
JW:

One thing that I found - you did a survey of voting

responses to tax levies to show that the schools, in the
multiple-motivation area, were supported by the parents who
received that money.

The newspapers, I guess, had been saying

that Dayton View was opposed to tax levies and you were trying to
show that, no, that it could take hold.

I guess it was a problem

with what you considered Dayton View and what areas were included
in the ... and you were trying to show that multiple-motivation had
a positive effect, at least on voting patterns.
PW:

Yes.

JW:

You know you were saying about the Dayton View

Stabilization grant being folded into the Model Cities - I found
a public opinion survey - was the public opinion service from
downtown, from city hall?
PW:

Yeah, there was an independent agency that we funded.

It began in 1970.

JW: They surveyed the residents in Dayton View ...
PW:

Oh, there's Tim, and Clarence ...

JW:

... And found in 1974 that most of the residents didn't

think that they had an organization that stood for them.
PW:

In Dayton View?

JW:

Yeah.

PW:

In 1974?
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JW:

Yeah, which would be after the Stabilization Program

was folded into the Model cities.
PW:

Yeah.

I don't recall that but the Northwest Priority

Board never took hold.

To this day.

JW:

I served on it.

PW:

Of all the priority boards it was probably the weakest

in terms of links back to the neighborhood; and it's always been
that way.

So that wouldn't surprise me at all.

I remember

because the Northwest Priority Board - well, now - but those
neighborhood associations were never as strong as the neigborhood
associations in the southeast.

Joe said that they - there was a

new view in those organizations - except for the Triangle
Association, even today, most of them were not very strong
neighborhood associations.
along.

Now College Hill is sort of coming

But the Triangle was probably only the legitimate

neighborhood association in terms of a neighborhood association
as I would recognize them as being from the southeast.

I'm

talking about an organization where everybody is involved and
everybody knows the organization and they either hate the people
or the like the people.

That's not true in the Northwest.

there's never been very much links.

So

Besides that, Northwest

doesn't get along together.
JW:

No, we don't.

I live on Euclid, so it's my

neighborhood.
PW:

I know that when they fund projects, for example, when

they rank projects, they do not rank them based on any objective
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criteria whatsoever.

I could never look at that list and go,

"They made a judgement about this.
showed after the meeting."

Oh, no.

That's what we

They're going to get somebody;

they're going to make this a dumb project number one.
nothing to do with the value, the intrinsic value.

It has

While in the

southeast - I'm on that one because I live there - I get their
list of projects, I know that they had made this judgement based

on, things that I would not know, I have faith that what they
told me is indeed a ranking that means something.

And in

Northwest there's liable to be all kinds of dead bodies along the
way.

JW:
time.

I want to thank you once again for taking all this

You've been helpful.
PW:

... kids went there.

JW:

You said that Lincoln School was the best example of an

integrated education?
PW:

Yeah.

I think of IGE ..

JW:

You think of IGE as an integrated .... why?

PW:

And so does everybody ... I don't know; I don't have kids

so I can't respond.

I only know that the executives in city hall

who sent their kids to Lincoln were sending their kids to an
integrated school that created the appropriate environment for
integration.

That's how they viewed it.

two concepts together.

JW: They did or did not?
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They really linked the

PW:

They did, absolutely did.

You can talk to the city

manager, the former city manager, who is now in Illinois.

And

that's how he always referred to Lincoln.
JW:

The curriculum specialists who set up middle schools;

for example, in Dayton Public Schools, they did use individually
guided education but as a magnet to attract children.

The racial

integration came as a result of setting the environment; the
curriculum was separate.

They didn't necessarily reinforce each

other.
PW:

I see.

JW:

But that's not the view that you were getting from the

people around you?
PW:

Oh, yeah, absolutely not.

